Abstract. In the last few years, there have been several attempts to build identi cation protocols that do not rely on arithmetical operations with large numbers but only use simple operations (see 10, 8]). One was presented at the CRYPTO 89 rump session ( 8]) and depends on the so-called Permuted Kernel problem (PKP). Another appeared in the CRYPTO 93 proceedings and is based on the syndrome decoding problem (SD) form the theory of error correcting codes ( 11]). In this paper, we introduce a new scheme of the same family with the distinctive character that both the secret key and the public identi cation key can be taken to be of short length. By short, we basically mean the usual size of conventional symmetric cryptosystems. As is known, the possibility of using short keys has been a challenge in public key cryptography and has practical applications. Our scheme relies on a combinatorial problem which we call Constrained Linear Equations (CLE in short) and which consists of solving a set of linear equations modulo some small prime q, the unknowns being subject to belong to a speci c subset of the integers mod q. Thus, we enlarge the set of tools that can be used in cryptography.
The Underlying Problem
Since the appearance of public-key cryptography, basically all practical schemes have been based on hard problems from number theory. This has remained true with zero-knowledge proofs, introduced in 1985, in a paper by Goldwasser, Micali and Racko ( 6] ) and whose practical signi cance was soon demonstrated in the work of Fiat and Shamir ( 4] ). In 1989, there were two attempts to build identi cation protocols that only use simple operations (see 10, 8] ). One relied on the intractability of some coding problems, the other on the Permuted Kernel problem (PKP). The rst of the schemes was not really practical but has been followed by a truly practical proposal based on the so-called Syndrome Decoding problem (SD). The purpose of the present paper is twofold: { First, to introduce a new scheme based on a combinatorial problem which we call Constrained Linear Equations (CLE in short) and which consists of solving a set of linear equations modulo some small prime q, the unknowns being subject to belong to a speci c subset of the integers mod q. ? PATENT CAUTION: This document may reveal patentable subject matter { Second, to demonstrate in this setting, the possibility to have an identi cation scheme where both the secret key and the public identi cation key can be taken to be of short length. By short, we basically mean the usual size of conventional symmetric cryptosystems, i.e. 64 or 80 bits.
We brie y comment on the second point. Besides having been a long time challenge in public key cryptography, the question of short keys may be of practical importance. As is known, identi cation schemes avoiding large integers such as PKP or SD, are not identity based. This means that public keys should be related to the user's identity by a signature of some authority or by a directory, which the veri er has access to. If the second option is taken, then the key length becomes an important issue. It is even more important for the prover, a smart card in many practical applications: short keys may save space in the physically protected area of the card where they are stored and thus may allow the use of relatively low cost cards.
We now turn to our basic problem:
Constrained Linear Equations (CLE) instance: A (small) prime number q, a system S of r homogeneous linear equations with k unknowns and whose coe cients are integers mod q, a subset X of the integers mod q.
Question Is there a solution of S consisting of k elements of the given set X? It is easily seen that the problem is NP-complete. Our further assumption is that it is intractable in the following sense:
Intractability of CLE Assumption: No probabilistic polynomial time algorithm can take as its input the values of q, S, X and output, with non negligible probability, a solution of S consisting of k elements of the given set X. As usual, non negligible stands for bounded from below by the inverse of some power of the size of the input. From the practical point of view, we mention, as a minimal choice, the case where q = 257, k = 40, r = 20, jXj = 16. We do not really advocate these gures for highly secure applications but we use them as a convenient benchmark in order to establish comparisons with the minimal sizes provided for PKP or SD. The minimal size suggested for the SD identi cation scheme has been carefully analyzed in 3], where it is shown that the workload of the best possible known attacks is about 2
68
. The minimal size of the parameters in the original PKP proposal (see 8]) has been extensively discussed in 1, 7] . Attacks based on intelligent gaussian elimination and a space-time trade o yield a workload of 2
52
. Similar attacks can be carried against CLE and it can be seen that the gures chosen above yield a similar 2 52 workload. Thus, the comparisons in terms of key size will be signi cant. Whether or not this is enough for applications is open for discussion. We feel that, for secure applications, it is safer to recommend the following parameters for CLE: q = 257, k = 48, r = 24, jXj = 16.
Key Generation
The key generation algorithm is based on a trick which combines a linear operation and a highly non linear one. We feel that this trick might nd further applications in other areas of cryptography. The prime number q is such that q ? 1 is the product of two almost equal integers. Thus, 251 is 15 16 + 1 and 257 is 16 2 + 1. We write q ? 1 = c d. We next consider the multiplicative group of non-zero integers mod q. This is a cyclic group and we can easily build a subgroup G of order c. Picking one element in each class mod G, we get a set X, consisting of d elements such that any integer between 1 and q ? 1 can be uniquely written as the product mod q of an element of G and an element of X. We let g(u) the element of G appearing in the unique decomposition of u and, similarly, we let k(u) be the corresponding element of X. If U is a vector whose coordinates are non-zero integers mod q, we let g(U) be the vector obtained by applying g coordinatewise. k(U) is de ned accordingly.
Besides a xed prime number q, a subgroup G and a xed subset X as above, the proposed scheme uses a xed (n m)-matrix M whose coe cients are randomly chosen integers mod q. This matrix is common to all users and is originally built randomly. Each user receives a secret key S which is a vector with m coordinates, each a member of X. The public identi cation is computed as P = g(M(S)) Note that there is a (slight) chance that the computation of g(M(S)) cannot be carried through if M(S)) has some zero coordinate.A heuristic analysis shows that this happens with probability close to 1 ? (1 ? 1 q ) n . With the gures of the numerical example provided above, this is 0:07 and therefore, after a few trials, one can reach the desired value of P.
Clearly, recovering the secret key S from the public data P amounts to solving the equation P T = M:S where denotes coordinatewise multiplication mod q and where S, T are two unknown vectors, having respectively m and n coordinates, subject to the condition that these coordinates are members of X . Thus, one has to solve an instance of the CLE problem with n equations and m + n unknowns.
If we turn to our minimal size numerical example, we see that one can take q = 257 and n = m = 20. Furthermore, X has 16 elements as well as G. Thus both S and P can be coded on 80 bits. Without apparent consequence on the intractability of the combinatorial problem to solve, S can be generated deterministically from a (say) 64-bit seed. It is also possible to x the rst four coordinates of the public key P or (better) to derive them from the public identity of the user. The resulting public key is stored on 64 bits. The key generation uses, as above, the idea of multiple trials. The expected number of trials until an acceptable key is found is about 7 10 4 , which is still reasonable. A few more bits could even be saved by analogous tricks. We feel that these manipulations do not a ect the security of the scheme that we will present, but this opinion should be further investigated. If we turn to alternative numerical example mentioned above, we nd the following gures: q = 257, n = m = 24, jXj = jGj = 16. Using the tricks just described, this is still compatible with secret and public keys of 80 bits.
We will now describe, in the style of 8, 11], two interactive identi cation protocols by which a prover demonstrates possession of the secret key S corresponding to the public key P.
A Three Pass Identi cation Protocol
As is the case for the PKP and SD schemes, we will need some cryptographic hash function H. This hash function should be collision free as will be discussed further. For practical implementations, a standard hash function such as Rivest's MD5 ( 9] ) can be used. The protocol includes several rounds, each of these being performed as follows:
1. The prover picks at random two vectors U, V having respectively m and n coordinates, each an integer mod q. He also chooses two random permutations and . operates on the integers f1 mg and on the integers f1 ng. Then he sends commitments h 1 ; h 2 ; h 3 respectively computed as The number r of consecutive rounds depends on the required level of security and will be discussed further on.
A Five Pass Identi cation Protocol
We new describe an alternative protocol allowing identi cation. Again, this protocol includes several rounds, each of these being performed as follows:
1. The prover picks at random two vectors U, V having respectively m and n coordinates, each an integer mod q. He also chooses two random permutations and . operates on the integers f1 mg and on the integers f1 ng. Then he sends commitments h 1 ; h 2 respectively computed as Having checked this equality, the veri er also tests that the vectors received at step 5 are such that all of their coordinates are members of X.
Security of the Scheme
It is apparent that the security of the scheme relies on the di culty of solving the equation P T = M:S where P is the public key of a speci c user and S, T are two unknown vectors, having respectively m and n coordinates, subject to the condition that these coordinates are members of X . In order to perform the rst protocol without knowing the secret key, various strategies can be used. { Having only U, V , and ready for the veri er's query and replacing the unknown S, T by arbitrary vectors with coordinates in X. In this case, the false prover hopes that b is 0 or 2 and the probability of success is 2=3 for a single round and (2=3) r in general, where r is the number of rounds. A similar strategy can be de ned with U + S, V ? T in place of U, V . { Having simultaneously U, V , U + S 0 and V ? T 0 ready where S 0 , T 0 is a regular solution of P T = M:S (i.e. without the constraint about X). This yields the same probability of success. It is fairly clear that shifting beetween one strategy to another has also the same probability of success. Similar strategies can be designed for the second protocol with probability of success q+1 proof: Consider the tree T(!) of all 3 r executions corresponding to all possible questions of the veri er when the adversary has a xed random tape !. Let = Pr(T(!) has a vertex with 3 sons ) If is < , then, it is easily seen that the probability of succes of the adversary is bounded by (2=3) r + : (2=3) r comes from the case where T(!) has no vertex with 3 sons and from the other case. Thus is at least and by resetting the adversary 1= times, one nds, with constant probability an execution tree with a vertex having 3 sons. Repeating again, the probability can be made very close to one. Now a vertex with 3 sons corresponds to a situation where 3 commitments h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , it is possible to prove a more foundational result, which shows that repetition of either protol is a proof of knowledge of a solution of the constrained system P T = M:S We state such a result for our rst protocol. We let N denote the size of the public data.
Theorem2. Assume that some probabilistic polynomial-time adversary is accepted with non negligible probability after playing with a fair veri er a number of rounds of the rst protocol that is (log N), then there exists a polynomialtime probabilistic machine which extracts a secret pair S, T from the public data or outputs collisons for the hash function, with overwhelming probability.
Before we turn to zero-knowledge, let us observe that, at step 3 of the rst protocol, the prover eventually discloses the image of the secret pair S, T, under two random permutations and . A similar remark applies to the other protocol. Thus, the exact repartition of the values of the unknowns in S and separately in T have to be considered as public data. This information makes the computation of the solutions of P T = M:S a bit easier. We have taken this into account when analyzing the security of the CLE problem. Still, it is advisable to avoid irregular distributions (e.g. where an element of S appears many times).
It can be proved formally that both schemes are zero-knowledge. We will only give a brief hint for the rst protocol. As we observed above, anyone can be ready to answer two queries among the three possible ones at each round. Hence, by using the standard idea of resettable simulation (see 6]), one can devise a polynomial-time simulation algorithm that mimics the fair communication between the prover and the veri er in expected time O(2=3:r). Some remarks are in order here:
1. As was just observed, the exact repartition of the values of the unknowns in S and T are basically public data. This does not contradict zero-knowledge as they leak equally from the actual executions and the simulated ones. 2. Hash values make the simulation a bit harder: a convenient setting is the so-called random oracle model (see 2]). Alternatively, one has to assume speci c statistical independance properties for the hash function.
6 Performances of the Scheme. 4 . In order to achieve a level of security of 10 ?6 , the rst protocol has to be repeated 35 times and the second one only 20 times. Whether or not this is a serious drawback should be discussed with practical implementations in mind. We simply note that the number of interactions is almost the same in both case, because the second protocol needs more passes. 5. As is the case for PKP and SD, our scheme is not identity based. This means that public keys have to be certi ed by the issuing authority or that the veri er needs to access a directory. As emphasized in the introduction, the distinctive character of the scheme, namely the short key length, is a de nite advantage in the latter case.
An Additive Variant
Before concluding the paper, we brie y mention an alternative approach for key generation: let X and Y be two subsets of the set of integers mod q, such that any integer can be written (non necessarily in a unique way) as the sum mod q of an element of X and an element of Y (it is not di cult to construct such subsets). From a random vector S xith m coordinates, all in X, one can compute M:S as T + P, where T, P are vectors with n coordinates respectively in X and Y . One can take P as a public key and keep S, T secret. The resulting CLE problem is written M:S = T + P where S, T are unknown vectors with coordinates in X. Protocols to prove knowledge of the secret data are simple variants of those described above. We do not know whether this alternative key generation method is weaker than the original one. We suspect it might be the case if X and Y are chosen in a simple way (e.g. by specifying that elements of X are those with prescribed bits equal to zero).
Conclusion
We have de ned a new practical identi cation scheme based on a combinatorial problem which we call CLE (Constrained Linear Equations). This scheme allows the use of keys of short length (64 or 80 bits). We have proposed two protocols using CLE: both only use very simple operations and thus widen the range of techniques that can be applied in cryptography. We welcome attacks from readers and, as is customary when introducing a new cryptographic tool, we suggest that the scheme should not be adopted prematurely for actual use.
